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The ambiguous infrastructural ideal: the urbanisation of water and power and the 
'golden age' of utility networks 
 
Denis Bocquet (CNRS-LATTS) and Fionn Mackillop (LATTS) 
 
Abstract 
 
Current debates around networks and urban fragmentation focus on the ownership of the 
service to explain processes of socio-technical differentiation in cities (splintering). In this 
perspective, integrated public ownership and management historically allowed for service 
universalization and the emergence of a “modern infrastructural ideal”, whereas recent trends 
towards privatization and unbundling are seen to foster fragmentation. In this paper, we argue, 
through an historical appraisal of the rolling out of water and power networks in very different 
contexts, that ownership is just one of the factors in urban network service provision and 
management, and that the local socio-political context must be taken into account to 
understand how and why networks are universalized (or not) and what socio-spatial effects 
they produce. Beyond ownership, network provision and management thus emerge as a 
reflection of social dynamics and ties in specific, place-based urban contexts. The aim is thus 
to challenge the mechanical link that sometimes appears in research between network 
ownership and territorial fragmentation. With case studies chosen from various socio 
historical contexts, from Papal Rome to colonial Cape Town, statist Paris to liberal Los 
Angeles, we argue that, even if ownership remains one of the important key factors in 
explaining dynamics of „splintering‟, we must heed the whole framework of governance 
specific to each situation, which goes far beyond the mere issue of formal network 
governance. We thus resort to the concept of urban regime, studied in a historical perspective, 
to situate the socio spatial dynamics of networks, between market forces, and the private 
interests of elites, and issues pertaining to mechanisms of wider social control, which is where 
the notion of regulation is useful to us. Moreover, it is necessary to take into account the 
problematic of the political economy of network utilities, which goes beyond the simple logic 
of private vs. public ownership.  
 
 
 
Recent debates on the potential role of networks of public utilities in processes of urban 
fragmentation, as illustrated in the seminal research carried out by Stephen Graham and 
Simon Marvin
1
, have shown how important the issue of the socio-spatial diffusion of urban 
technical networks is: the latter, in conjunction with the urban regimes that plan and develop 
them according to certain strategies, are now perceived as instrumental in accelerating or even 
enabling the “coming apart” of cities, or, in other words, their increased polarization through 
the valorising of “powerful users” and places, accompanied by the parallel exclusion of  
places and users that are less valued. An era of network deregulation and “unbundling”, 
ushered in by the rising influence of market-based network operation, is said to have replaced 
the post-second-world-war “Golden Age” that saw universal access to networks under public 
control. Thus, in this perspective, networks can sustain tendencies towards fragmentation by 
their socio-spatial effects.  
Through a historical analysis of the social, economic, political and spatial issues of network-
building in different cities, we discuss this perspective and open other avenues for reflection. 
The “urbanisation of water” as we see it is thus not only a process such as the one theorized 
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by E. Swyngedouw, but also a reading of what we see as the key points that led to the 
building of complex urban regimes for the governance of networks
2
. For us, what is at stake is 
not only the “constraint of flow”, but most of all the building of new social, administrative 
and economic procedures that urbanize a resource or a technology, i.e., that adapt its 
implementation to the urban regime, whilst shaping urban regimes through this very process. 
At the core of discussions about the governance of utilities, we often stumble upon the 
question of ownership. Entire theories are built upon a typology of network ownership 
regimes. Far from denying the validity of ownership as a key point in understanding 
networks, we strive here to discuss its relevance in relation to other possible key points. 
The aim of the present paper is thus to examine in a comparative perspective the development 
of networks of water and power in relation to the issue of urban growth and planning, as well 
as reflect on the respective influence of private and public companies in different historical, 
social, economic and spatial contexts. In other words, we take concrete examples of the 
rolling out of urban technical networks in varied socio-spatial and historical contexts to put 
theoretical debates in perspective, and challenge assumed visions. Indeed, the paper 
encompasses such diverse contexts as Africa, North-America and Western Europe from the 
end of the Nineteenth century to the Middle of the Twentieth century, thus enabling us to 
build a complex framework of analysis of the dynamic relationship between networks and 
societies.  
The main conclusion is that there is no mechanical link between the development of 
networked services and social and spatial fragmentation processes. In some contexts, apparent 
“paradoxes” can even occur: a public company as a challenger against a private monopoly, or 
a landed oligarchy supporting the municipalization of water, or universalization and a form of 
social justice through commoditization and intervention of private interests. But if ownership 
is not the single key factor in universalization, it might be because there is a whole set of 
complex key factors, the variety of which is linked to the specific socio-spatial contexts and 
the urban regimes they support. The aim of this paper is then to explore these key factors, in 
relation with the strategies at stake within urban regimes. Indeed, the focus on ownership is 
one of the bases of the “splintering urbanism” approach, thus, discussing the importance of 
ownership is a way of discussing the validity of the latter and to explore paths towards an 
increasing complexity of the paradigm. 
 
Placing network production in a historical perspective: what does “ownership” mean?  
 
A common representation of the relationship between network ownership and processes of 
network universalisation focuses on the idea that public ownership and management ensure a 
fast and socially fair diffusion of the service, while private control of networks is seen as a 
factor of inequities and patchy diffusion of networks. This may or may not be true currently 
and in the recent past, but, at any rate, the history of the diffusion of networks in the cities that 
we have studied is an invitation to challenge these assumed visions of the relation between 
form of ownership and the socio-spatial dynamics of network development. This does in no 
way mean that there is no relationship, but just that the relationship, far from being 
mechanical, needs to be read in a more context-based way. 
Both Cape Town and Los Angeles were characterized by municipal ownership of water 
networks during the periods studied here
3
, as well as by municipalization of an initially 
privately owned electric power service; yet the expansion of the networks followed different 
patterns and rhythms, which shows that the official form of ownership is not a determining 
factor. 
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In the case of Los Angeles, public ownership of the water service was achieved in 1902, after 
the approval by the population of a bond issue which enabled the city to purchase the 
infrastructure of the private Los Angeles City Water Co (LACWC). The latter, indeed, had not 
done a very good job at developing the service in Los Angeles, even though it had 
considerably improved the situation when compared to the preceding attempts by individual 
entrepreneurs, which had led to sometimes dramatic failures. The LACWC was the first 
attempt at making delivering domestic water to LA a business as such. Yet, the CEO of the 
LACWC admitted to seeking a “100 cent return on every dollar invested”4, thus neglecting 
areas of the city that were difficult (hence less profitable) to serve (e.g. hills), or not investing 
in proper pipes, and keeping a very reduced staff. Moreover, the LACWC did nothing to find 
a solution to the growing needs of a booming city, i.e. a new and durable source of water in a 
semi-arid land. Municipalization appeared as a possible response to impending doom for the 
city and the desires of its elite to make it grow. Under municipal management, increasing 
resources were allocated to the water service, allowing for a long term solution to the water 
crisis (the gigantic Owens Valley aqueduct built under the aegis of W.Mulholland between 
1906-1913
5
); moreover, the newly formed Water Department committed itself to expanding 
the service at competitive prices (LA was consistently cheaper than other big US cities during 
the period), for domestic users, but also for industrial and commercial ones, at very low 
prices. Innovative solutions (such as charging higher prices for agricultural use of water in the 
San Fernando Valley north of the city, to fund the construction of the water network there at 
almost no expense for the department) permitted the department to ensure total coverage of 
the city , even though it had grown impressively in size and population during the period
6
.  
Cape Town provides a different illustration of the case of municipal operation of the water 
service. Indeed, the context was radically different, that of a British colonial city in Southern 
Africa, with an essentially strategic use as a point of replenishment for commercial and 
military ships; thus, access to water for the military was at the heart of the very existence of 
the city. There appears to have been no explicit desire to universalise the service, as opposed 
to the case of Los Angeles where the political and economic elites, albeit for various reasons, 
wanted universalisation to take place. Throughout the period studied, and even though some 
progress occurred, the water service was marked by often dramatic insufficiency and great 
social, and in the case of Cape Town (although gradually and through a complex process) 
(Bickford, 1995) racial inequities. Municipal ownership didn‟t prevent investments in the 
water service from being insufficient and directed in priority towards the wealthiest and most 
powerful social categories (even though a large part of the middle classes shared in the 
general predicament, because of their living in the upper portions of the city, with no access to 
water). 
The service was also technically backward for a long time, as well as unhygienic (Cape Town 
suffered a terrible outbreak of bubonic plague in 1901, whereas the rate of various epidemics 
collapsed in LA after municipalization and the widespread use of chlorination). In 1920, 
access to water was far from universal, poor neighbourhoods, like District 6 (which 
concentrated the greatest part of the population) still had to rely on unreliable public 
fountains
7; the Cape Peninsula area (which was merged into one unified “City of Cape Town” 
in the 1910s) was characterized by important geographical (and thus social, due to the 
distribution of population according to social status) differences in the quantity and quality of 
water received: some suburbs, such as Wynberg, where the population was exclusively white 
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and middle/upper class, could boast a relatively efficient water supply and service, whereas 
many others (especially working-class, coloured Woodstock) where characterized by an 
insufficient supply and bad service. Even though the quest for a sustainable water supply for 
the Peninsula led to its (reluctant) unification
8
 around Cape Town, and thus fostered at least 
superficial political integration, the water service itself didn‟t witness such an evolution 
towards integration, and remained patchy as well as socially selective.  
 
In the case of electricity, in both cities, a period of private operation of the service was 
followed by municipalisation. The building of electric networks is a much “lighter” operation 
than the building of water networks and the return on investment thus appears potentially 
more attractive to private companies. This explains that private development of the electric 
service often works out better in terms of diffusion of the service than private operation of the 
water service.  
In Los Angeles, the private Los Angeles Electric Co. was founded in the mid 1880s; it 
concentrated its investments on the profitable downtown area of the city, where all the office 
buildings were located. But the supply was quickly insufficient in the face of growing 
demand, and several big consumers- such as the streetcar companies
9
- started to generate their 
own power. At the turn of the century, several small private electric companies operating in 
LA merged and formed what would become the gigantic Southern California Edison 
(SoCalEd). Although Edison increased its investments, they remained concentrated on the 
downtown area and emerging industrial areas, such as the San Pedro harbour zone south of 
the city. Moreover, the emergence of other private competitors (Pacific Light and Power, Los 
Angeles Gas and Electric) with each their own technical standards and pricing policies made 
the market complicated and fragmented, while the practice of making small consumers 
subsidise big ones (by charging the former much more than the cost of production, and the 
latter, much less) precluded maximum diffusion of the service, even though the power market 
grew fast in LA.  
A policy of universalisation via municipal operation of the service was initiated “by accident” 
in 1916, since it was not intended that the city enter the power business, with the switching on 
of the city‟s first power plant, which could generate cheap power thanks to the Owens Valley 
aqueduct (thus, municipal water subsidized municipal power, making the case for an 
integration of both services under the aegis of a municipal department). The city‟s Bureau of 
Power and Light became a challenger to private operators, and gradually pushed them 
towards bankruptcy with its cheap hydropower. In 1922 the Bureau of Power and Light 
purchased SoCalEd, and gradually took ownership of the other operators. It pursued a policy 
of universalization through low prices and ensured universal access to municipal power at the 
end of the 1930s
10
, which saw the emergence of the unified Los Angeles Department of Water 
and Power (LADWP), still in charge today.  
 
In the case of Cape Town, the production of electric power started in 1893, with the building 
and operating of a small plant by the German company Siemens-Halske, paid for by the 
municipality. Rapidly, the city put an end to its contract with the firm and decided to manage 
the service itself, due to widespread dissatisfaction with the quality of service and the growing 
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delays to be connected to it
11
. The electric service was rapidly envisioned as a cash machine 
for the city (selling expensive power to rich citizens
12
, not universalising the service or 
stimulating industrial and commercial use), and current was sold at high prices, thus limiting 
the number of customers to less than a hundred at the turn of the century; what‟s more, the 
city was already struggling to cope with such a modest load, due to insufficient capacity and 
reliance on the old-fashioned central station architecture. Moreover, Cape Town did not have 
the benefit of readily available sources of water to produce cheap hydro-power. The 
beginning of the 20
th
 century was marked by the concentration of investments on the central 
districts of the city, the business area, as well as the building of a new plant essentially 
designed to supply the Colonial Government (Harbour Board and railways) in bulk, thus 
maintaining the use of the plant as a cash machine for the municipality; this also illustrates the 
fact that power production in Cape Town, as well as water management, were submitted to 
the policies of the colonial government and its needs, thereby showing the importance, from a 
regulation perspective, and in the context of uneven development mediated by colonialism, of 
global relations of power and dependence on the operation of local utilities. Moreover, the 
few industrial and commercial clients were subsidised by benefiting from power sold under 
the cost of production. Thus, the number of private clients only grew in the wealthiest 
categories (production capacities allowing: many demands had to be turned down due to a 
limited capacity of the system) and not in the poorer districts
13
.  
As we can see, neither the provision of electricity, nor the water service, could be considered 
anywhere near universal at the end of the period we studied. 
 
In Rome, the issue of the universalisation of the provision of water was dealt with in the 
context of a complex situation regarding ownership: in Papal Rome, from the time of the 
Renaissance, this service was traditionally a matter of government competence. It was also a 
matter of prestige for the Pope, and his image as a good ruler was promoted through public 
works. The provision of water to the city often served as an occasion to celebrate the 
efficiency of Papal rule, and each time a new aqueduct was put in service or an ancient 
aqueduct fixed, a monumental fountain was built to recall to role of the Pope. But a few years 
before he lost his capital city, seized in 1870 by Italy, Pope Pio IX decided to implement a 
great reform in the field of the provision of water, by giving a private company a concession. 
This company, the Acqua Marcia (later renamed Acqua Pia in honorem Pio IX), was given in 
1865 the exclusive right to transfer water from the renowned Marcia spring. The 1865 
concession, which was meant to expire in 1964, did not provide the company with a formal 
monopoly, but gave it a great advantage. The concession was attributed to Niccola Moraldi, 
Giovanni Enrico (John Henry) Fawcett and Giacomo (Jack) Shepherd
14
 with the clear intent 
of protecting Catholic interests in the city. Two of the three businessmen were English, and 
Catholic and English funds were invested. This project reflects the way in which the Papacy 
was inserted into international financial networks and the way in which privatization was 
intended as a protection against a possible seizure of the town by Italy. The creation of the 
new corporation was later confirmed by the Pontifical Ministry of Trade and Public Works, 
on March 24, 1868, at which point the concession was given the legal status necessary to its 
continuation in the case of a change in sovereignty. The new service was inaugurated in 
September 1870, only ten days before the city was seized by Italian troops. And when Rome 
was formally integrated into the Italian Kingdom, becoming its new capital city, the 
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concession was confirmed, as the Italian government was obliged to recognize deals made by 
the previous government. The municipality, reformed according to Italian law, only got 
control over three minor aqueducts, with no right to extend its network. The 1865 concession 
was clearly a way for the Pope to keep control of a major urban service despite the loss of 
sovereignty and avoid being dependent on another authority. 
What is interesting is that even in such a situation, univerzalisation did not depend on 
ownership. Between 1870 and the beginning of the XXth century, the Acqua Marcia company 
was obliged to extend its network even towards the poorer parts of the city, whatever the 
political context: when conservative Catholics close to its shareholders ruled the municipality, 
they had to act so as not to appear too insensitive to the situation of the inhabitants, and when 
the municipality was in the hands of the Progressives, the private company generally had to 
accept negotiations over the provision of water to new neighbourhoods. 
Pressure from inhabitants generally proved efficient, as everybody knew that the company 
was owned by a few families of Catholic aldermen. If they wanted to keep benefiting from 
popular confidence, they had to take into account major demands for better life, in a way that 
recalls the old-regime situation. 
Pressure from the municipal council also proved efficient: obliging the company to accept 
unprofitable extensions of its network was a way to make the whole concession acceptable. 
And for the company, accepting to serve unprofitable parts of the city served as a way to 
protect the concession against major legal and political attacks by the municipality when it 
was in the hands of the Progressives. Universalisation, in this context, came as a political and 
social duty imposed to the company by the functioning of the whole urban system. In a first 
phase, extension of the network towards poorer parts of the city generally took place after a 
petition of inhabitants had been sent to the municipal council and a prominent person
15
. 
In a second phase (1905-1950), when the municipality tried to develop its own service by 
building new aqueducts, the private company chose to forego any major investments and 
waited for the 1964 deadline and the unification of the service. But universalisation was on its 
way, as the municipal service served ever more neighbourhoods. What is remarkable is that in 
1964, when the concession expired and the whole service became municipal, no real 
difference in service could be felt between parts of the town served by the municipal or the 
private company. This does not mean that no difference in service existed, but just that 
ownership was not the major issue.  
Electricity in Rome, just like in many other cities, was first used as an alternative to gas street 
lighting. Gas had enjoyed a huge growth since the middle of the XIXth century. In 1847, a 
company founded by the Trouvé brothers obtained the first concession. The company, in 
1849, was christened “Imperial City of Rome and Italian Gas Light and Coke Company”. But 
the most important initiative came from Jack Sheperd: in 1852 he founded the “Società Anglo 
Romana per l‟Illuminazione a Gas di Roma” and managed to unify the service in the whole 
city under the aegis of this new entity. When Sheperd died in 1869, after having created the 
water company Acqua Marcia, the Anglo Romana was run by Pouchain (Poggi, 1971). After 
the Italian government had taken control of Rome, the company, thanks to the concession 
agreement granted by the previous government, managed to keep its prerogatives. It began 
developing an electrical service in 1882. Engineer Guglielmo Mengarini was in charge of 
choosing and developing the best technical solution for Rome. After some initial experiments, 
mostly in the field of illumination, powered by a provisional plant situated in the Termini 
train station, the first power plant was created in 1885 next to the gas plant in via De‟ Cerchi. 
From 1886 service also began for private subscribers, initially in the neighbourhood of Piazza 
Colonna. But most of the buildings served during this first phase were dedicated to public use 
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(the Parliament, many theatres…). Private subscription remained an exception. But when in 
1892 the nascent Roman network was connected to the newly created Tivoli hydropower 
plant, new perspectives emerged. From the very beginning in Rome, electricity was linked to 
the provision of water: not only was the founder of the gas company, which later became the 
gas and power company, given the concession on the provision of water in 1865, but also the 
technical development of the network was linked to the region of Tivoli and its exceptional 
water resource. 
The distribution network was developed according to a radial morphology from the 
transformation station of Porta Pia
16
. Power entered into town from more or less the same 
point than water. The first phase in the development of subscription was conducted by a 
private company. But in 1907, Mayor Ernesto Nathan, leader of a Progressive coalition, 
decided to create a municipal power company, as a challenger to the private Anglo-Romana. 
This was not a municipalisation of the existing private company, but the creation ex-nihilo of 
a municipal company to challenge the private one. Progressives thought that the Anglo-
Romana was not intent on developing a service adapted to the needs of the municipality, and 
of the general public, at an acceptable price. Engineer Giovanni Montemartini was asked to 
implement the project. He first had a plant built in San Paolo and the first kilometres of cable 
installed in the city. The system was later completed by a hydro power plant on river Aniene. 
In spite of the collaboration between the two companies, through a consortium (1924), for the 
production of power in Tivoli, distribution remained separate for decades. In the 1920s and 
1930s, the development of the domestic uses of electricity, and of the number of 
subscriptions, took place in the context of a dual system: a former private monopoly, and a 
new public challenger. 
In Paris, the situation was very different, but in the end, universalisation followed a parallel 
path. The provision of water, and more generally the competence over water resources, had 
become municipal, and remained so during the XIXth century. But two innovations took 
place: the increasing role of the state alongside that of a private company. From the time of 
Napoleon, and then again from the 1830‟s, modernising the capital city became a priority, and 
Paris‟ municipal technical services were under increasing control of state engineers. This 
situation came to a head during the IId Empire, under governor Hausmann. On the other hand, 
the private sector also managed to strengthen its positions. In 1860 the Compagnie Générale 
des Eaux was given a 50-year concession in Paris. But municipal services, ruled by state 
engineers, remained in charge of technical matters and of decisions about extensions of the 
network. The apparent privatization was only a privatization of the billing function, not of the 
infrastructure, not of the technical personnel. Privatization, in a way, accompanied 
commoditization, and was used as a tool both to soften its effects and to insert a more 
aggressive commercial dimension into public service. From 1860 a peculiar situation arose in 
Paris: a municipal public service, run by state personnel, the financial exploitation of which 
was handed over to a private company. But studies on the extension of the network and on 
choices about discrimination in the service, social or spatial, show that no link can be 
established between the organisational scheme and the general policy. Matters of hygiene and 
rationality in the development of the network seem much more important. 
The universalization of the access to tap water in Paris occurred in two phases. In a first 
phase, the municipal service provided access through public fountains. One can estimate that 
in the 1860s every inhabitant of the city had access to such a fountain not far from home. This 
can be considered as a first age, in minor, in the universalization of access to water. The 
universalization of home access took place in this context of an already publicly subsidized 
access through fountains. And the study of this process in Paris shows that the fact that the 
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distribution of water (not the production, nor the management of the network) was in the 
hands of a private company did not specifically influence the rhythm of universalization. At 
every stage of the process, public intervention softened the rule of the market that the private 
company would have been eager to apply. Not only were investment in the network and its 
management public, but public subsidizes were used every time the growth of the rate of 
connection encountered a new obstacle. Reforms of the pricing policy were also implemented 
on several occasions in this period. In the long term, spatial inequities between different parts 
of the city also appear as irrelevant. This does not mean that temporary inequities did not 
exist, nor that they were not relevant in the life of inhabitants, but just that the network in 
itself can not be seen as a factor of urban fragmentation, and that on the contrary the 
development of the network had a corrective effect. As for electricity, the evolution in Paris is 
similar: in the 1920s, universalization was progressively achieved in a situation in which a 
private company (Compagnie Parisienne de Distribution d‟Electricité) received major 
subsidizes from the municipality for the development of the network and for the provision of 
power to larger parts of the population
17
. 
 
These examples show that the ownership of utilities does not necessarily determine the 
universalisation of the service and its rhythm. The importance of the local context must thus 
be emphasised and analysed carefully, because the concepts of “private” and “public” 
ownership correspond to different realities according to the context in which they take place, 
that is, the particular urban regimes that form the backcloth of city life and development: the 
“official” discourse on universal access in LA masked the land and resource grab carried out 
by the “oligarchy”; in Cape Town, public ownership coexisted just fine with the obliteration 
of entire segments of the population from network access, and even an inflexion towards 
helping “the deserving poor”18 (i.e. whites , seen as “willing to work” , vs. blacks, seen as 
inherently unfit for work , just a “degenerate residuum”) , at the end of the 19th century, didn‟t 
materialize in any real bettering of their situation. In Rome, the private ownership of the 
company was due to specific historical events, and the fact of the company being private did 
not exonerate its owners from taking into account the local social situation and the general 
demand for an efficient public service. What counts is the whole context of network 
governance. In Paris, the matter of ownership was more complicated that one might think. 
The concession to a private company did not prevent either the state through its technical 
bodies, nor the municipality through the institutional and financial role of its services, to 
shape the governance of the network and to be determinant actors in the issue of 
universalization. 
 
 We must thus question these terms and uncover the political nature of networks: they are not 
“neutral or “just” technology, but tools in political issues and projects. Thus, their socio-
spatial development ,and the question of pricing, are political issues.  
 
Challenging the political neutrality of technology: networks as socio-technical 
constructs.  
 
The building of urban technical networks, their subsequent universalisation (or not), the 
technical and pricing choices that structured networks of water and power in the cities that we 
have studied, were in no way the fruit of a linear process, a “rational” voyage towards the 
networked cities that Paris, Rome, Los Angeles, and, albeit less comprehensively, Cape 
Town, are today. Networks were built according to political ideals and choices, they were 
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enmeshed in political controversies and struggles between social groups to defend ideals and 
sometimes, plain material interests. It is necessary to uncover the political stratum on which 
these networks were predicated, in order to understand their evolution and their social and 
territorial impacts. 
 
In Los Angeles, network building and subsequent universalisation were in no way the fruit of 
a spontaneous process or the result of purely philanthropic goals (such as making city 
dwellers‟ lives “better”). Indeed, the municipalisation of water was first envisioned in a very 
pragmatic way, and was brought about through a no less pragmatic agreement, both formal 
and informal, between various components of the city‟s political and economic elite. The 
city‟s economic “oligarchy”19 (real estate promoters, railway magnates, bankers…all united 
behind Harrison Gray Otis, owner of the Los Angeles Times) foresaw that only massive 
municipal investment could bring the water required to develop the arid San Fernando Valley, 
and open it to agriculture and massive settlement. Aware of the building of the aqueduct, 
thanks to the presence of members of the oligarchy on the city‟s water board20, these 
businessmen purchased vast swathes of the then-cheap land, and were able to make a fortune 
once water made it developable. 
 Their longer term interest was also to make water easily available throughout the city, to 
stimulate its growth, commercial and industrial activities, and the city‟s- and later the 
region‟s- general prosperity. This goal of prosperity was shared by the population at large; it 
was also shared by the Progressives, a very influential political force in US cities (1900-
1920), in favour of public ownership of utilities (to make utilities the “people‟s utilities”) , 
curbing the influence of private enterprise, and also ensuring widespread access to water and 
power as a way of enhancing people‟s lives in general. The Progressives were also influenced 
(just like most of the population) by the idea of a “City Beautiful”, with luscious vegetation 
and wide, open spaces, then envisioned as the model for future cities
21
. 
Thus, spreading out the networks was a way of spreading out the city, and, also, in practice, 
adapting to and supporting its tendency to sprawl, for a variety of reasons: the configuration 
of the network, the investments decided, the technical characteristics of the system, were 
deeply rooted in political ideals and decisions, clear choices that united distinct groups of the 
population of LA behind the municipalisation of water and the massive investments in the 
water service.  
This political (in the widest sense of the mechanisms of a polity) aspect of the issue appears 
even clearer when the question of water is contrasted with what happened with electricity. 
Indeed, municipalisation of power was only completed in 1936, by phases, producing a rather 
fragmented electric service throughout the metropolis (different technical standards, different 
pricing …) and inequities between users (industrial users subsidised by private consumers for 
instance). The municipal venture into the field of electricity generation and distribution, from 
the 1910s, was initiated almost by stealth. Indeed, the “oligarchy”, which had supported the 
municipalisation of water, strongly opposed that of power, because it interfered with the 
business of many oligarchs (or that of their connections in private power companies), and also 
because they had no clear interest in municipal control of the service. Moreover, the 
“Progressives” were not a monolithic group, and some of them were not opposed to private 
power in a city where public ownership of utilities was and had always been a rarity, which, 
once again, underlines the specificity of the political compact that permitted municipalisation 
of water and then of power, at a particular moment of history, in the particular context of LA 
political life at that time.  
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In Cape Town, the importance of the specific political context played an equally fundamental 
role in the development of water and power grids. In marked contrast with Los Angeles, 
universalisation of networks was never a goal; it was certainly not a goal of the “Dirty Party”, 
a coalition of land and real-estate owners of mainly Dutch origin, in favour of “economy” in 
the field of urban investments, i.e. keeping expenditures down to keep rates down. They did 
nothing to find a long term solution to the growing lack of water in the city (and the whole 
Cape Peninsula: scorn was their approach to municipalities wanting to cooperate with the 
“Mother City”), and were quite content with a series of  (uncoordinated) makeshift solutions 
to the water supply problem, that basically led to generalized bad service (the “dribble” 
system, unhygienic, open to fraud and costly, instead of the “full bore” for the provision of 
water), and even worse service for the poor, who had to depend on public fountains that ended 
up being cut off most of the day, or, when they worked, were often contaminated due to the 
parlous state of sanitation in the city (itself linked to insufficient water)
22
! This fostered 
epidemics and hindered the growth of the city. In an apparently paradoxical situation, the 
“Dirties” were supported by most of the poor (most of whom were Black or Coloured) who 
also wanted to keep rates down, in order to be able to afford the rent… 
 The poor were no better off when the “Clean Party” 23 was in power (from 1882 to 1890 and 
in the 1910s) : this alliance of English-speaking businessmen (as opposed to old-style rentiers) 
had an interest in a better water supply, both economic (more water for industry, shipping, 
breweries) and ideological: this bourgeoisie built a Victorian-influenced concept of 
“cleanliness” related to “Englishness”, the idea that Cape Town had to be cleansed of its 
African heritage, seen as a culture of “filth and vice”. Thus emerged the idea that most of the 
poor neighbourhoods (which happened to be mainly “Coloured” or Black), such as District 6, 
were hopelessly filthy and could be neglected
24, while the “useful” parts of the city (the 
business district, city hall…) were to benefit from the bulk of the investment in networks to 
make the city more profitable and amenable to business. The social “residuum” was gradually 
evacuated towards “locations”, such as that of Uitvlugt, outside the city, and given a limited 
water supply to maintain the working force. We therefore have a prime example of a network 
“bypass” in favour of powerful users/spaces…organized by a municipal utility, not by a 
private company.  
Thus, water and power supply progressed in some parts of the city, as well as in the wealthy 
(white) suburbs of the city, but remained globally deficient in poor neighbourhoods. 
Moreover, for “Cleans” and “Dirties” alike, water and power were often seen as cash 
machines, a commodity that could be sold in the city (and in the dependent suburbs of Cape 
Town) at a premium, in order to reduce city rates; thus, water and power users, whatever their 
social status, subsidised the wealthy rate-payers of the city. Even though water and power in 
Cape Town were under municipal control, like in Los Angeles, the process of network 
building and development was quite different and did not give way to universalisation. The 
social (and, in this case, racial, since in Cape Town race and class are very close concepts) 
bias introduced in the access to networks can still be felt today: even though most of the city, 
broadly speaking, enjoys a high rate of connection, important parts of the population are 
poorly or not connected, and the (socio-) racial connection bias lives on.  
 
In Rome, the water company acted as a political body from its very creation. Conceived as a 
way to protect Catholic interests in the city even after it was lost by the Pope, the Acqua 
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Marcia Corporation followed all the major political changes in urban life between 1865 and 
1964, when it appeared to be the object of a complex political construction, made to prevent 
Catholic interests from losing power in the Eternal City. Shareholders and board members of 
the company were predominantly members of the Roman aristocracy and at the same time 
conservative members of the municipal council. When it became clear that the city was to 
become the capital city of Italy, Catholic capital was invested in technical modernisation and 
in public services. 
Between 1870 and 1885 several attempts were made by Progressive members of the 
municipal council to change this situation, but with little success. In 1872, and then again in 
1882, mayor Pianciani tried to advance municipal provision of water, but couldn‟t succeed 
because of the 1865 concession. The issue of water came on the agenda as a symbol of a 
political dominance inherited from the past and given by the Pope to the city as a legacy and a 
way to exert control over municipal affairs. Water was always the object of political 
interpretations, and a reflection of debates on the institutional organisation of the capital city. 
In 1885, the Conservatives tried to adapt the water company to the new local political context, 
in order not to be exposed to the opposition‟s blame in a way that could endanger the whole 
domination of their group on the municipal scene. After the return of Pianciani as a mayor, 
and his second fall against a conservative alliance, the municipal administration was led by 
Duke Leopoldo Torlonia. He was one of the major landlords in town, owned hundreds of 
hectares of land, had earned a fortune in selling a part of it and represented on the local 
political scene the epitome of the convergence at work between Conservatives of both sides, 
Catholic and National (Ciampani, 2000). Negotiation with the water company was part of the 
deal: an apparent easing of the domination of the private company against the guarantee that it 
would last. But it can also be read differently: the Company agreed to sell some water to the 
poor at a reduced price, and the Municipality let it earn high profits with the rest of the 
population. Negotiations were led, in the name of the municipal technical services, by 
engineer Angelo Vescovali. He was the head of the hydraulic service
25
. An agreement was 
finally found, for a period of 25 years (1885-1910). On December 2, 1885, the Acqua Marcia 
was granted the exclusivity on any new aqueduct construction
26
. In exchange, it accepted to 
comply with some demands of the municipal service like the implementation of reduced 
prices for some categories of the population. The municipality also accepted to renounce its 
quest for new subscribers and to limit the expansion of its own network to the sole fulfilment 
of municipal and industrial needs. As a compensation, in order to satisfy a demand for social 
equity, the company accepted to serve eight public water points in the surroundings of Rome. 
At a time in which rural zones in the vicinity of Rome were progressively becoming lower-
class suburbs and were rarely served by public services, this was a way for the company to 
improve its reputation, and for the municipality to avoid having to do the works itself. In this 
case, universalisation came with a difference in the quality of service. But a few year later 
improvements were done, after demands by inhabitants. The company also had to grant 
industrial workers‟ houses (when designated as such by municipal services) preferential 
prices. This social measure, which may seem important, was of little significance for the 
company: official workers‟ houses were few, and projects for construction, such as those 
promoted when Pianciani was mayor, were even fewer.  
Thanks to these few concessions during an important moment in local political life, the 
company managed to reinforce its de facto monopoly. Mayor Torlonia wished to grant the 
company a 40-year advantage. But facing opposition of a part of the Municipal Council, he 
had to accept to limit this period to 25 years. Torlonia gave the Acqua Marcia in 1885 the 
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perspective of great and long-lasting profits anyway: social measures were symbolic, and the 
main point was the elimination of the threat of any upgrading of the municipal service. Once 
again the water service was treated as a political matter. And once again, universalisation 
found its way in a not necessarily favourable situation. 
In 1888, the Municipality tried to propose some new measures,
27
 because the Progressive 
opposition inside the municipal council denounced the collusion between Torlonia and the 
Acqua Marcia, and the way in which municipal interests were mistreated. Torlonia was forced 
to create a commission. F. Nobili-Vitelleschi wrote the report. He proposed an interpretation 
of the 1885 convention that could allow municipal services to extend their network. As long 
as the municipal council remained in the hands of Conservatives, nothing was done. But the 
debate was launched. 
In 1897-1898, a new controversy between the municipality and the water company broke out, 
about service in the Agro Romano, the surroundings of Rome
28
. In 1893, the company decided 
to discontinue free service to some fountains
29
, and it appears that at the turn of the century 
the company tried to pull out of non profitable operations, a decision which was politically 
sensitive for the municipality. 
The Giolitti Act of March 29, 1903, gave municipalities the possibility to municipalize public 
services, namely water, transportation, telephone, energy (Calabi, 1980; Gaspari, 2000). A 
municipal provision of water was the most emblematic proposal, and its social implications 
were underlined by its promoters. In Rome, the Conservatives, unsurprisingly, chose not to 
proceed with municipalisation. 
The debate flared anew when Mayor Ernesto Nathan came into office. Municipalisation was 
at the heart of the electoral campaign of 1907. The Progressive coalition, led by Nathan, 
stayed longer in charge than the two former led by Pianciani. Nathan remained in office until 
1912. His coalition included Democrats, Radicals, Socialists and Republicans. It benefited 
from the contemporary presence of Giolitti at the head of the Italian central government. 
Nathan succeeded in contesting the aristocratic hegemony on urban life and economic 
matters: public transportation was municipalized and a municipal power company was 
created. 
A local referendum was organised on September 20, 1909 and municipalisation was 
approved. The government approved it too. But it was a different problem for water. The fact 
was that municipalisation of the provision of water was not possible in Rome, since it would 
have violated the terms of the 1865 concession and of the 1885 convention. It was politically 
impossible for any Italian government to validate the spoliation of the interests of the Catholic 
world in such an aggressive way. Municipalisation was demanded by the most leftist 
members of the Nathan coalition, but remained out of reach because of its diplomatic 
implications. The municipality itself, having signed the 1885 convention, had no right to ask 
for municipalisation. Any measure would have not only been politically sensitive, it would 
also have been invalidated by court decisions. The path towards municipalisation was closed 
for Nathan. 
The only other way to contest the monopoly of the private company was to find a way to 
improve the public municipal service and get the right to extend it. 
At the beginning of the XXth century, the municipal service provided water to only a small 
part of the city. The issue for Nathan was on the one hand to serve a wider area, and, on the 
other, to provide better water quality, in order to be able to compete with the private service. 
Under Nathan, the Vergine aqueduct was equipped with a pressurisation device, in order to 
deliver water to higher floors in apartment houses. Municipal services also tried to promote a 
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favourable interpretation of the 1885 convention: they bought Acqua Marcia water and resold 
it through municipal aqueducts. Municipal engineers also began to study the possibility of 
diverting water from the Pescheria River, more than 100 km away. The time line, in that case, 
was 1910, and the end of the 1885 agreement. If municipalisation was impossible, it was 
possible, from 1910 on, to develop the municipal service as a competitor to the private one. 
Municipal engineer Mario Moretti submitted in 1906 an ambitious project for the 
development of the municipal provision of water
30
. The proposal was discussed at the 
Municipal Council of April 2, 1906. The idea was to use the Traino aqueduct. Moretti‟s 
proposal had two sides: some works to be done immediately, and some others later, in the 
perspective of 1910 and the end of the 1885 convention, in order to strengthen the municipal 
service. 
Since the 1890s, the question of the surroundings of Rome was of great importance again. As 
the Acqua Marcia Company had clearly demonstrated that it had no intention to serve that 
area (the investment was much too high and the profit to be expected too low), municipal 
services stepped in with their own supply projects, which was a way of challenging the power 
of the Acqua Marcia company. From 1908 to 1913, municipal services surveyed the Pescheria 
River. But the end of the 1885 convention had little effect: the Nathan coalition fell shortly 
after. After the War, the municipality was in the hands of conservative Catholics again, with 
Mayor Colonna. Once again, political change in Rome proved crucial in decision making 
processes concerning public utilities. 
It was only when the Municipality became a Governorate, under Fascist rule, that projects 
were promoted again. There were still only two ways of intervening: the development of the 
public network, and pressure on the private company. The Pescheria project was revisited in 
1937, but it was not enough to challenge the company yet. The Vergine Aqueduct was also 
the object of heavy investments. 
In 1937, the gubernatorial (ex-municipal) electric company and the gubernatorial (ex-
municipal) water service merged. The new public company was called AGEA (Azienda 
Governatoriale Elettricità Acqua). After pressure from the Fascist government, a convention 
was signed in 1938 between AGEA and Acqua Marcia: the private company kept its historical 
base of subscribers (and the profits it provided) whereas some parts of the city to be equipped 
(and the investments required) were handed over to the public company
31
. Thus, 
universalisation of the service was achieved through the intervention of the public service. 
In 1944, with the return of the previous municipal organisation, AGEA became ACEA 
(municipal). When the waters of Rio Pescheria arrived, in 1949, the public service 
experienced a rapid growth. ACEA also benefited from special financing measures, as defined 
in the 1953 special law for Rome. Thanks to new funds, the Pescheria works started again. An 
84 km gallery was built. Since the 1930s, Acqua Marcia was only expecting the end of the 
concession and making money from its old subscribers. At the end of the concession in 1964 
its services were integrated into ACEA. It was a de facto municipalisation. But what the 
Roman case shows is that the political stakes were always very high. At every period of its 
development the network was the object of intense political investments, and the decision-
making process cannot be understood without taking this dimension into account. 
 
In Paris, the political role of networks was apparently less marked, as neither the ideological 
split nor the institutional struggle were as strong as in Rome, but it was still very important, 
mostly in the definition of the institutional frame of the capital city. The provision of water 
was during the whole period the matter of a constant struggle between the municipality and 
the state. The fact that it was given to a private company, in 1860, introduced only few 
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changes. The peculiarity of Paris might be in the importance of the question of the provision 
of water for the image of the central government. Although the competence was municipal, 
with a delegation to a private company, what was at stake in Paris was often the capacity of 
the government to both modernize its capital city and ensure social equity. In this case, the 
period of the 2d Empire (1852-1870) is crucial: a dictatorial technocracy led to the greatest 
achievements ever in the process of universalization, showing that even the relationship 
between democracy and universal service responds to more complex stakes that often 
admitted. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
What appears with the study of these examples is the fact that networks are objects of 
complex processes of governance, and that their management is fully inserted into a wider 
frame in which many elements intervene to alter what could be a mere technical vision. Thus, 
the nexus between networks and fragmentation is more complex than one could think. This is 
not to say that a network does not produce fragmentation. Temporary fragmentation, common 
in the processes we describe, is still fragmentation, and is felt as such by inhabitants. Our 
point is just that in the end universalisation takes place and that ownership is not a 
determining issue in the different stages of the process. But there are also other sorts of 
discrimination: quality of service (different springs, pressure). If in Rome it is clear that social 
situations were not necessarily an issue and that topography was much more important, at 
least between 1870 and 1910, it does not exclude the occurrence of spatial discriminations in 
other cities. What is to be discussed is mostly the character of the provision of water as a 
speculative operation when the purview of a private company. The various examples we have 
examined, though not excluding of course the pursuit of profit, show that even a private 
company is obliged to respect a certain social agenda, in the context of a system of 
governance that precludes the mere quest for profit, and, most of all, even in the case of a 
privately operated service, public institutions intervene both to make the company moderate 
its views and to subsidize the provision of the service for poorer parts of the city. 
The current trend towards privatisation and “unbundling” (dissociation of production, 
transportation and distribution) of networked urban services
32
 is seen by some researchers, via 
the “commodification” of services that it seems to imply, as a major factor of urban 
fragmentation, i.e. the “coming apart” of cities, for instance through the inequities induced by 
new pricing practices, or the “bypassing” of the poorer, less profitable users. This could be 
opposed to a “golden age” of urban networks under the aegis of integrated, public operators 
that ensured greater social justice.  But the study of the history of networks in our panel of 
cities shows that things are more complex, and that the differential treatment of users is not 
necessarily to their detriment, and, conversely that the public management of utilities does not 
always imply a fairer and equal treatment of all users. Studying the concrete history of 
utilities is a way of building an informed critique of a supposed “golden age”.  
Actually there was no “golden age” of public service, and, conversely, no dark age of network 
construction either. Discrimination, social and spatial, was not created by networks, nor even 
accompanied by network construction: the set of cities we have studied shows that the 
situation on the scene of basic networks such as the provision of water is generally better than 
in society in general: differences in the service were often less important than the general 
social situation could suggest, which is not to say that there isn‟t a gap or that it is politically 
acceptable from our point of view. Networks are just not vectors of segregation, because of 
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the high political and social stakes associated with them. Solutions always have to be found 
and result in a trend towards universalization though social mediation and negotiation. 
 
Our research illustrates the importance of “urban regimes”, as defined by Stone and Lauria 
(1997), in the dynamics of urban networks. Indeed, in the context of a “division of labour” 
between government and private interests, the latter use their influence to obtain public 
investments for their own benefit, based on the place dependency of government and its 
obligation to deliver economic benefits to its population
33
, as well as satisfy its own need for 
revenue to maintain and reproduce itself. Thus, the universalization of networks can be seen 
as a part of the dynamics of urban regimes and their need to compete against other cities, in a 
regional at first, and then national, and now increasingly global arena, while delivering to 
their constituents: urban regimes have to “win the hearts” of the population as Harvey 
Molotch (1976) has shown in his analysis of the “growth machine” in the United States. This 
shows how the question of official ownership can lose at lot of its relevance in the analysis of 
the determining factors of universalization: indeed, we can see that urban networks are clearly 
at the articulation of government and private interests, they are part of strategies that respond 
to both public and private needs, in other words they are co-products of government and 
governance. While the building of more or less comprehensive networks of water and power 
served purely material interests of some parts of society in all of our case studies, especially in 
the field of land speculation and dynamics of capitalist (sub)urbanisation, we also note that it 
was also part of the (re)definition of the image of the city: its self-image, as well as the image 
it was eager to project; thus, the building of networks is also part of a symbolic process of 
territorial grammar, that is not only economic, but socio-spatial. Thus, in the context of 
tensions between Cape Town‟s British and Dutch elites at the turn of the century, the 
investment of British capital in “urban renewal”, that is in part in the development of water 
and power networks targeting specific areas of the city valued by British capital, was designed 
to equate “britishness” with cleanliness and efficiency, and usher in an era of “modernity”. In 
Los Angeles, building networks was a step in ensuring the city‟s regional dominance over a 
growing “aqueduct empire” (Starr, 2000). This symbolic aspect of network building, which 
contributes to the socio-spatial transformation of cities, is also independent from the issue of 
ownership and connected to the dynamics of urban regimes that link private and public 
aspects of governance in common strategies.  
 
Our aim was also to try and propose an increasingly complex vision of the political economy 
of urban utilities. As this domain has generally been read through the dominant lens of 
ownership, a trend that led to great results in our understanding of network development
34
, 
current debates call for the inclusion of new key factors, such as the relationship between 
local elites and land development; the whole structure of governance (behind the simple 
government factor); the existence of public policies aimed at controlling urban developments; 
the political representation of the poorest parts of the population; the possibility of subsidizing 
private companies in the utilities sector or the role of the „civil society‟ and its civic relays, 
which can induce a private company to act according to more complex rules as the ones 
suggested by an impersonal notion of the market; or the two-way interaction between the 
sphere of business and society. The rhythm of the history of network governance has long 
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been structured by a triple sequence of concession / municipalization / privatisation. In order 
to understand more of the complexity of real life situation, we must go beyond this trilogy, 
challenging its universal relevance, and try to introduce into the private sphere elements of an 
analysis based on the social sciences: mediation, negotiation, compromise, consensus. The 
“universal moment” was not necessarily “monopoly‟s moment” everywhere, and even when it 
was, it might have been for more complex reasons than the mere juxtaposition of terms 
indicates
35
. 
We also wanted with this paper to confront to the “time factor” in the history of urban utilities 
networks development, in order to try and nuance some current theories about hot spots and 
their possible driving effects. Our case studies indeed suggest that fragmentation can be a 
stage in a development toward universal service. What is important then is not only to 
describe the moment of the segregation, but also to understand which are the key factors that 
can lead to the overtaking of it. Was Haussmann‟s Paris an hot spot in late XIXth century 
France, concentrating public and private investment for the greatest benefit of a few. Maybe, 
but the study of what happened in the surroundings of Paris in the next decades clearly shows 
that the driving effect worked: the private companies, both for water and power, were induced 
to serve the suburb with the same level of service. Not only thus thanks to the market, but 
largely thanks to the organisation of suburban municipalities in syndicates in order to increase 
pressure on the companies. This might be part of a driving effect itself more complex than the 
mere mechanics might suggest. 
 
Another point we wish to underline is that, whatever the form of ownership, be it public or 
private or a combination thereof, utilities supplying essential urban services such as water and 
power are not submitted to market processes alone, or, conversely, to administrative fiat, but 
are embedded in dynamics of regulation, as theorized by Aglietta and Lipietz, that span 
multiple scales of government and governance, and reflect cultural norms and values that are 
socio-spatially contingent. Indeed, the regulation- which implies the well-known distinction 
between régulation and réglementation- of utilities is part of the instable and constantly 
challenged and therefore rewritten socio-spatial fix to capitalism and its local interpretation, 
of which urban regimes form a central component. 
Governments can choose to impose minimum service requirements to private utilities whereas 
public utilities can very well be considered cash machines for rentier municipal regimes. 
Utilities, regardless of their official status of ownership, come under the pressure of the 
population or activist fractions of the population over particular issues at specific moments in 
history, whether the issue is urban regime efficiency, public hygiene or social justice. There is 
a compact, both formal and informal, with the local population, that undergoes perpetual 
contestation and must be adapted; that is how utilities can be sometimes municipalized, 
sometimes privatized, as a part of this process of regulation‟s ebb and tide. Therefore, one 
should be weary of attributing too much explanatory power to the notion of ownership, 
because utilities are embedded in urban societies, both materially and socially, and thus 
cannot be abstracted from their context.  
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